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Fiscal Rules and Electoral Turnout  
 
Abstract  
A growing literature has argued that electoral turnout decreases the more government policy is 
constrained by economic and institutional factors. This article investigates whether a certain type of 
policy constraint, fiscal rules, lowers turnout. Since fiscal rules set limits for government fiscal 
policy, they should lower the incentive for citizens to participate electorally. However, using 
parliamentary turnout data in a large panel of democratic countries, little robust evidence is found in 
favor of fiscal rules having a depressing effect on electoral turnout. Analysis of European 
individual-level data also suggest that national fiscal rules do not affect inequality in electoral 
turnout between income groups either. Difference-in-discontinuity evidence from Italian 
municipalities further suggest that the results are causally identified.  
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Introduction  
The determinants of electoral turnout and other aspects of political participation are classic 
questions in political science and continues to be at the forefront of the political science research 
agenda (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Blais 2006; Cox 2015) as well as normative discussions 
about democratic politics (Lijphart (1997). A recent revitalized both scholarly and normative 
discussion is whether constraints on government action reduce citizens' incentive and willingness to 
participate electorally and thus reduce electoral turnout (Steiner and Martin 2012; Marshall and 
Fisher 2015; Steiner 2016; Häusermann et al. 2018). This article deals with the subject of policy 
constraint and electoral turnout in the context of national fiscal rules.  
 
National fiscal rules are of growing importance as governance institutions in these years. National 
fiscal rules can be defined as rules or rulesets which by national law and/or regulation set numerical 
limits and/or guidelines for government debt, deficits and even revenue and expenditure 
(Schaechter et al. 2012, 5). Examples of national fiscal rules could be that the constitution states 
that the public budget should be in balance, that there exist expenditure ceilings for government 
expenditure, which the government needs to take into account when drafting the public budget, or 
the existence of a law which sets a maximum allowed level of public debt as a percentage of GDP. 
While an active research agenda in public economics assesses the potential effect of fiscal rules on 
government fiscal policy (Heinemann et al. 2018), the political effects of these types of formal 
constraints on government fiscal policy remain under-researched in political science. Which is in 
contrast with the extensive research on the politics of central bank independence (Fernandez-
Albertos 2015), another potential constraint on government policy. Given that these types of rules 
deal specifically with constraint on arguable one of the most important aspects of government 
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policy - fiscal policy - and seems to be spreading fast among countries, confer figure 1, this lack of 
scholarly interest is remarkable.   
 
Figure 1: Share of the World's countries with national fiscal rules in place 1985-2014 
 
Note: Source is IMF's Fiscal Rules' Database.  
 
As these rules are increasingly being implemented nationally and are being increasingly promoted 
by international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European 
Union, they are also the subject of normative and public discussions, including their effects on the 
functioning of national democracy. As noted by the United Nations’ and the International Labour 
Organization’s staff members Anis Chowdhury and Iyanatul Islam in a critique of the increased 
tendency to implement fiscal rules, “If the intention is to remove discretion from politicians, then 
how can they implement their election manifestos? The national budget is an important instrument 
for fulfilling promises made by political parties. By removing this instrument, fiscal rules can 
potentially undermine accountable governance, especially in new democracies. Therefore, one may 
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ask, “credibility for whom” – electorates or financial markets? Thus, by trying to enhance the 
credibility of governments in the eyes of financial markets, fiscal rules can undermine the 
credibility of a democratic polity.” (Chowdhury and Islam 2012).  
 
However, these normative arguments about the potential impact of fiscal rules on national 
democracy are usually just based on assumptions rather than actual evaluations of the potential 
effects of these rules. While recent empirical and theoretical work indeed suggest that citizens’ 
engagement with national politics can be negatively affected by formal constraints on government 
fiscal action (Hortala-Vallve and Larcinese 2017; Häusermann et al. 2018), the democratic effects 
of the spread of fiscal rules have received no systematic empirical scrutiny. Unlike the issue of 
globalization and turnout (Steiner and Martin 2012; Marshall and Fisher 2015; Steiner 2016), no 
empirical research has been done on whether the introduction of fiscal rules will lower electoral 
turnout and whether these rules affect turnout inequality. This article specifically addresses these 
issues.  
 
Using parliamentary turnout data in a panel of 103 democracies, this article tests the effect of both 
the existence and strength of national fiscal rules on electoral turnout. The use of fixed-effects 
estimation makes it possible to compare turnout levels within countries which experience changes 
in the fiscal rules framework and thus to better assess whether the enactment of fiscal rules actually 
reduces electoral turnout. The empirical results, however, lends little support for the argument that 
fiscal rules depress turnout levels. Only expenditure rules seem to have a clear negative association 
with electoral turnout and even here the results are not particularly robust, especially when 
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restricting the sample to the stable democracies of the OECD, where we should expect fiscal rules 
to be most effective.  
 
Regarding inequality in turnout, further analysis of individual-level European data also suggest that 
fiscal rules do not increase inequality in electoral turnout between income groups either. Analysis of 
fiscal rules in Italian municipalities using a difference-in-discontinuity design provides further 
causal evidence that fiscal rules do not seem to matter for electoral turnout. While fiscal rules might 
under some circumstances constrain fiscal policy, they do not seem to affect electoral turnout. 
 
Theory: Fiscal rules as constraints   
The basis for a relationship between fiscal rules and electoral turnout is that the incentive and 
willingness of citizens to turn out in elections are negatively affected by constraints on future 
government action, and that fiscal rules can been seen as such a constraint. The general argument 
for a link between constraints on government action and electoral turnout rests on the classical 
assumption that one important aspect of citizens' choice of whether to turn out in elections is 
whether their vote actually matter for future government policy and societal outcomes (Downs 
1957, 44). Constraints on the government’s action should mean that the outcome of an election has 
a more limited chance of actually changing future policy and outcomes, even if the government has 
changed as a consequences of the election, which in turn reduce voters’ propensity to vote in an 
election.  
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This argument follows the logic of a number of voting models. In a study of government constraint 
and electoral turnout, Marshall and Fisher (2015) model the constraining argument by using the 
classic calculus-of-voting equation (Riker and Ordeshook 1968),1 where increased government 
policy constraints lower the relative benefit from one’s favorite candidate winning in an election 
which in turn reduces the incentive to vote. Similar results follows from applying other theoretical 
models of the voting action. Taking the view of the alternative calculus-of-voting model proposed 
by Franklin (2004), increased formal policy constraints would lower the prospect for an election to 
bring about any substantive policy changes both positive and negative, which should decrease the 
substantive competition between the political parties running in the election which again would 
decrease citizens’ incentive to vote (Franklin 2004, 57).  
 
The voting models and arguments mentioned above rest on a very instrumental view of the voting 
action, which have received substantial criticism in their failure to withhold empirical scrutiny.2 
However, also more non-instrumental arguments can be made in favor of policy constraints as 
having a negative effect on turnout. If citizens increasingly view the government as being unable to 
actually change policy and/or having less legitimacy due to being subject to different rules and 
external constraints, rather than the wishes of the voters, they could view the voting action as 
illegitimate and thus be more likely to abstain, see Birch (2010, 1602-1603) and Miles (2015) for 
                                                          
1  =  −  + , where R is the utility from participating in the voting action and thus the incentive to vote. P is the 
probability that the voter’s own vote is pivotal in bringing the voter’s favorite candidate to win, B is the relative 
benefit the voter gains from having the favorite candidate win, C is the cost of voting, while D is the intrinsic value of 
voting.  
2 See (Enos and Fowler 2014), (Gerber et al. 2017) and (Moskowitz and Schneer 2018). See also review by Geys (2006).  
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discussions about legitimacy and turnout.3 So for both instrumental and non-instrumental reasons, 
increased policy constraints in the political sphere should have a negative effect on turnout.  
Most scholarship and normative discussions about the effect of policy constraint on electoral 
turnout has dealt with globalization and other types of international economic integration (Steiner 
and Martin 2012; Marshall and Fisher 2015; Steiner 2016). The central argument in these studies is 
that increasing economic interdependence and capital mobility will constrain national governments 
in the economic policies they are able to pursue and thus reduce voters’ incentive to participate 
electorally, since the scope of economic policy change has been narrowed.4 Empirically, these 
studies have generally confirmed this negative relationship between globalization and electoral 
turnout and have thus provided evidence in favor of the argument that constraints on government 
action reduce turnout. Häusermann et al. (2018) take this perspective to the area of fiscal policy, 
and their results also suggest that constraints on government fiscal policy in the form of high 
government deficits and high government interest rates reduce turnout among citizens.5  
 
However, until recently the literature on constraints on government action and turnout ignored the 
potential effect of fiscal rules on turnout, even though these rules specifically acts as formal 
constraints on government fiscal policy, through the existence of expenditure ceilings, rules for 
when public debt can be issued and numerical limits on government deficit and debt levels. Taking 
                                                          
3 In the Riker and Ordeshook model this would represent a decrease in D.  
4 A similar arguments have been made about economic globalization causing a convergence of political parties’ 
positions on economic issues (Steiner and Martin 2012; Ward et al. 2015). 
5 Contingent on citizens’ level of education.  
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the perspective from the government constraints literature, we should expect these rules to affect 
electoral turnout negatively in the countries they are enacted in.  
 
A recent exception to the scholarly void regarding fiscal rules and turnout is a paper by Hortala-
Vallve and Larcinese (2017) who develop a theoretical model which deals with a formal constraint 
on government fiscal policy choices. Here, the argument is that as a government faces more policy 
restrictions, especially within fiscal policy, voters will have less incentive to acquire political 
information. This will in turn lower turnout, especially among relatively poorer voters.6 
Consequently, even fiscal policy constraints and rules specifically designed to increase the welfare 
of voters, including poorer voters, can increase turnout inequality and - under some circumstances - 
lower redistribution and consequently negatively affect poorer voter’s welfare through the turnout 
channel.7 According to these arguments, we should expect fiscal rules not only to decrease 
aggregate turnout but also to increase turnout inequality.8 However, while building on a large 
theoretical and empirical literature within the turnout and redistribution research agenda (Hortala-
Vallve and Larcinese 2017, 411-414), this paper is purely theoretical.  
                                                          
6 In their model, policy restrictions do not always lead to a lower turnout among poorer voters (Hortala-Vallve and 
Larcinese 2017, 418).  However, the model generally follows that logic that policy restrictions decrease the incentive 
to acquire political information which disproportionally decreases turnout among poorer voters, since they have less 
political information to begin with. This decreases their electoral turnout since some level of political information is a 
prerequisite for participating in elections (Hortala-Vallve and Larcinese 2017, 413-418). 
7 Through the mechanisms of the well-known Meltzer and Richards (1981) model where the level of redistribution is 
determined by the relative income of the median voter, which is relatively lower and thus yield a higher level of 
redistribution if poorer voters actually turn out in elections. See also Larcinese (2007).   
8 Research also suggest that decreased overall turnout increases turnout inequality and vice versa (Bhatti et al. 2018).  
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Thus, according to the theoretical and empirical literature on constraints on government action and 
turnout, fiscal rules should both decrease aggregate electoral turnout and increase turnout 
inequality. This article puts these arguments to empirical testing.  
 
Fiscal rules and aggregate turnout: Data and estimation 
To test the effect of fiscal rules on aggregate electoral turnout, I use a dataset of turnout in 
parliamentary elections in a wide variety of countries in the years 1985-2012. All countries - which 
regularly hold elections - hold parliamentary elections and most democratic legislative assemblies 
have substantial power over fiscal policy,9 and the enactment of the public budget is usually the 
prerogative of the legislature. Given that turnout determinants seem to differ between democracies 
and non-democracies (i Coma 2016), I restrict the study to democracies, which I define as countries 
having a score on the well-known polity2 index above 5. I also look at the relation between fiscal 
rules and turnout among in a more restricted sample consisting of the more economically developed 
and political stable countries of the OECD, where government efficiency is greater and fiscal rules 
therefore should be expected to be more effective (Bergman and Hutchison 2015) and thus more 
likely to act as a de-facto constraint on government policy.   
 
As the measure of electoral turnout I use turnout as percent of voting age population. This measure 
is a somewhat more uncertain measure of turnout than using turnout as percent of registered 
voters10 but it has the advantage of taking into account the incentive to even register as a voter, 
which could also be affected by fiscal rules and other policy constraints. Using turnout as percent of 
                                                          
9 Although this power might differ between countries (Wehner 2006).  
10 This is reflected by the fact that turnout in some cases exceed 100 percent in the data.  
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registered voters yields largely similar results.11 Turnout data is from the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance’s Voter Turnout Dataset (IDEA 2016).   
 
The central independent variables are national fiscal rules. These rules thus excludes supranational 
fiscal rules such as those associated with currency unions such as the European Union’s Economic 
and Monetary Union. The focus on national fiscal rules enables me to test the more pure effect of 
fiscal rules on electoral turnout, whereas potential effects of supranational fiscal rules might capture 
the turnout effects of closer political-economic integration rather than the effects of fiscal policy 
rules. National fiscal rules are measured by two types of variables for each type of fiscal rules as 
defined by the IMF (Schaechter et al. 2012, 7-9):  
• Expenditure rule. 
• Revenue rule. 
• Deficit rule. 
• Debt rule.  
The main type of variable is a simple dummy which takes the value 1 if the country has a fiscal rule 
of the given type in place which has statutory or constitutional basis. These types of fiscal rules 
should at least officially be legally binding for fiscal policymakers and thus act as a formal 
constraint on national fiscal policy.  
 
                                                          
11 Results are available upon request.  
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The other type of fiscal rule variable is an index which measure the strength of each type of fiscal 
rule. A description of the construction of these indexes is found in the online appendix D. The data 
for fiscal rules is from the IMF’s Fiscal Rules’ Database (Bova et al. 2015).  
 
As control variables,12 I include a number economic and political controls, which are generally 
viewed as influencing turnout level in the comparative turnout literature (Blais 2006). They include 
log of GDP per capita in constant dollars from the World Bank’s Database to control for the 
economic development of the country, a dummy for whether the country has a proportional 
electoral system13 and a dummy for whether voting is compulsory,14 which have all been found to 
be positively associated with turnout. I also include the log of population from the World Bank’s 
Database in order to control for changes in country population size, since turnout might be larger in 
smaller nations (Blais 2006, 117). Since the level of government debt might be endogenous to the 
enactment and strengthening of fiscal rules (Altunbas and Thornton 2017; Aaskoven 2018) and 
might also constrain government fiscal policy,15 general government gross debt as a percentage of 
GDP is also added as a control. Data from this variable is from the IMF’s Economic Outlook 
database. Descriptive statistics can be found in the online appendix A. 
 
                                                          
12 In appendix B, the aggregate turnout analysis is redone without the inclusion of these control variables. The results 
are mostly similar to the main estimations.  
13 From the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001).  
14 Data is from the Voter Turnout Dataset.  
15 See Häusermann et al.’s (2018) arguments.  
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To estimate the effect of fiscal rules on turnout, I run a number of ordinary least squares models 
with country-fixed effects. Using country-fixed effects enables me to hold constant potential 
unobserved time-invariant factors which might confound both national fiscal rules as well as 
turnout level and general political culture. These include legal origin (Alt and Lassen 2006) and the 
historical nature of fiscal relations between the executive and legislative branch (Wehner 2006).16 
By using country-fixed effects, I analyze changes in turnout within countries, since I analyze 
deviations from the country mean. Year-fixed effects are included in order to take a time trend into 
account which might correlate both with a development in electoral turnout and the tendency for 
more countries to adopt fiscal rules and strengthen their existing fiscal rules’ frameworks 
(Schaechter et al. 2012, 10-12).  
 
Using this estimation method, I am thus able compare turnout within a country in periods where the 
country had one or more fiscal rules in place to periods where the country did not have one or more 
fiscal rules in place. This approach resembles a difference-in-difference design and should identify 
the effect of fiscal rules on turnout assuming parallel trends (Angrist and Pischke 2009, 227-241). 
In order to address issues of autocorrelation, I cluster the standard errors at the country-level. The 
equation for the estimation can be seen below with countries index by i and years by t.   
	

 =  
 + + +  +  +                              (1) 
Where Turnout is turnout in country i in an election at time t. Fiscal rule is either one of the 
dummies for a fiscal rule with statutory or constitutional basis or the index for the fiscal rule 
strength. X is a vector of control, while γt and δi is the year- and country-fixed effects respectively. ε 
is the error term.  
                                                          
16 A central justification for the use of unit-fixed effects models (Imai and Kim 2018).  
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Results: Aggregate turnout   
In table 1, the results from the analysis of fiscal rules with statutory and/or constitutional basis on 
aggregate turnout are reported. Overall, the results do not support the argument that fiscal rules 
depress turnout as should be expected from the constraining argument. Only expenditure rule 
behaves as expected and seems to have a negative effect on turnout. An effect which is only 
statistically significant at the p<0.10-level. However, its substantial size is non-trivial. The 
introduction of an expenditure rule with statutory and/or constitutional basis seem to lower turnout 
with about three percentage points on average. However, when running an F-test after the 
estimation in model five, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the effect of the expenditure rules 
dummy is equal to the other fiscal rules dummies. Government gross debt seems to have no 
statistically significant effect on turnout, although the coefficient is negative as expected.  
 
Of the other cross-national determinants of turnout, which are included as controls, they either show 
no statistically significant effect on turnout, or for proportional electoral system the opposite than 
expected effect. However, the majority of these variable exhibit very little to no within-country 
variation in the analyzed time period, and changes to electoral system type and compulsory voting 
only occur in very few countries.17 When looking at democracies across time, there seems to be 
limited evidence in favor of the argument that fiscal rules, since they constrain government policy 
choices, depresses turnout. Only an expenditure rule seems to have a statistically significant 
negative effect on turnout. However, even there the effect is not strongly statistically significant and 
does not seem to be statistically different from the null effects of the other fiscal rules.  
 
                                                          
17 For compulsory voting, only Italy changes from compulsory to non-compulsory voting over the analyzed period.  
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Table 1: Fiscal rules dummies and turnout  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log of GDP per capita -2.70 
 (5.49) 
-2.57 
 (5.47) 
-2.29 
 (5.564) 
-2.38 
 (5.50) 
-2.32 
 (5.57) 
Proportional electoral system -6.87 
 (4.06)* 
-7.03 
 (4.10)* 
-6.93  
(4.07)* 
-6.81 
 (4.14) 
-6.90 
 (4.08)* 
Compulsory voting -1.67 
 (3.54) 
-1.63 
 (3.55) 
-1.73 
 (3.60) 
-1.56  
(3.55) 
-1.86  
 (3.61) 
Log of population -6.71 
 (9.09) 
-6.62 
 (9.05) 
-6.69 
 (9.03) 
-6.75 
 (9.03) 
-6.70 
 (9.15) 
General government gross debt -0.03 
 (0.02) 
-0.03 
 (0.02) 
-0.03 
 (0.02) 
-0.03 
 (0.02) 
-0.03  
(0.02) 
Expenditure rule -2.90 
 (1.56)* - - - 
-3.15 
(1.74)* 
Revenue rule - -2.49 (4.04) - - 
-1.38 
 (3.73) 
Balanced budget rule  - - 0.34 
 (1.71) - 
1.36 
 (1.96) 
Debt rule  - - - -0.39 
 (2.06) 
-0.83 
  (2.66) 
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of countries  103 103 103 103 103 
Number of observations 415 415 415 415 415 
F-test p-value - - - - 0.47 
Within R-squared  0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 
Note: Dependent variable is turnout as percent of voting age population. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.  
*: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. 
 
The introduction of a fiscal rule, with the possible exception of an expenditure rule, does not seem 
to have an effect on electoral turnout. However, a concern might be that the introduction of some 
sort of national fiscal rule was preceded by a general trend towards higher or lower electoral 
turnout, which might influence the interpretation of the above results and invalidate the model as a 
difference-in-difference estimate. In figure 2, electoral turnout is therefore analyzed and plotted 
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before and after the introduction of any fiscal rule with a statutory and/or constitutional basis.18 
Looking at figure 2, there does not seem to be any statistically significant effect of the introduction 
of a fiscal rule. The results also suggest no systematic trend in electoral turnout before the 
introduction of a national fiscal rule with a statutory and/or constitutional basis.  
 
Figure 2: Predicted turnout in the years before and after fiscal rule introduction 
 
Note: Vertical lines show 90 pct. confidence intervals. 
 
In a similar exercise in line with the difference-in-difference logic (Angrist and Pischke 2009, 237-
241), country-specific time trends are added to the estimations in table 1. The results are largely 
similar to the results from table 1, only expenditure rule seems to have a statistically significant 
                                                          
18 This figure is based on an estimation where the fiscal rules dummies are replaced with a number of dummies, which 
measure the time before and after the introduction of any national fiscal rule with either a statutory or constitutional 
basis. The table containing the results of this estimation can be found in appendix C.  
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effect on turnout. However, this is no longer the case when the sample is restricted to OECD 
countries, where none of the fiscal rules dummies have any statistically significant impact on 
turnout once country-specific time trends are included.19  
 
The results above are largely similar when the fiscal rules dummies are replaced with the indexes 
for fiscal rule strength. Only the strength of fiscal rules related to public expenditure seems to 
decrease average level of electoral turnout which provides substantial evidence against the 
argument that the constraint imposed by fiscal rules should decrease electoral turnout. These results 
are also robust to controlling for the influence of international organizations. These analyses can be 
found in appendix D.  
 
In appendix E, the sample is restricted to the general political stable and affluent countries of the 
OECD and the estimation from table 1 and appendix D are rerun. While the results are largely 
similar to the results from the wider panel of democracies, the negative effect of expenditure rule 
existence and expenditure rule strength decreases substantially, and expenditure rule strength is no 
longer a statistically significant predictor of turnout rates. The results suggest either a substantial 
difference in the effect of expenditure rule on turnout levels between OECD countries and other 
electoral democracies, or more likely that the negative association between expenditure rule and 
turnout levels previously found might be statistical fluke rather than a true effect. Especially, since 
expenditure rules are much more common in OECD countries compared to other democratic 
                                                          
19 Results are available upon request.  
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countries.20 Furthermore, due to greater government efficiency in OECD countries, expenditure 
rules are probably more likely to be properly implemented and thus act as a de-facto constraint on 
government fiscal policy in OECD countries.   
 
With the somewhat uncertain exception of expenditure rule, national fiscal rules do not seem to 
lower the aggregate level of electoral turnout in contrast to the argument that constraints on 
government action reduce turnout.  
 
Fiscal rules and inequality in turnout: Individual-level analysis   
The results from the previous section suggest that fiscal rules do not seem to have a particular 
robust effect on aggregate electoral turnout. However, since the analysis relies on aggregate turnout 
data, this approach to analyzing the relationship between fiscal rules and electoral turnout does not 
take into account potential heterogeneous effects of fiscal rules on different types of citizens’ 
propensity to turn out in elections. In line with the logic of Hortala-Vallve and Larcinese's (2017) 
model, formal constraint on public policy -  such as fiscal rules - might disproportionally decrease 
the incentive to turn out in elections among relatively poorer voters, while it might not decrease or 
even increase turnout propensity among more well-off voters.21 Taking this perspective, fiscal rules 
                                                          
20 In 2014, about 7 percent of non-OECD democratic countries had an expenditure rules with a constitutional or 
statutory basis in place, whereas 26 percent of the OECD countries had such a rule in place.  
21 A contrarian argument is made by Häusermann et al. (2018) who argue that it is mainly well-educated citizens 
whose turnout propensity is affected by fiscal policy constraints. However, re-running the estimations in table 2 and 
interacting level of education, instead of relative income, with fiscal rules yields similar null results for these 
interactions. These results are available upon request.  
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might not have an impact on overall turnout levels but might increase inequality in electoral 
turnout.22 To address this issue, I turn to analyzing individual level data on voter turnout and 
relative income and its interaction with fiscal rules.  
 
The data for this part of the analysis is the first 7 rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), 
which consists of individual-level survey data for 32 European countries23 and has been collected 
every other year from 2002 to 2014. To estimate the effect of fiscal rules on individuals’ propensity 
to turn out in elections, I run a number of linear probability models, where the dependent variables 
is dummy which takes the value 1 if the respondent voted in the last national election.24 A linear 
probability model is used due to the difficulty of interpreting interaction terms in non-linear 
estimations (Ai and Norton 2003). However, the results are not substantially different when running 
the models with a logit estimator.25 As the independent variable, I use an interaction between the 
existence of the different type of fiscal rules in the country of the respondent and the respondent’s 
                                                          
22 However, aggregate turnout rate and turnout inequality appear to be highly correlated (Bhatti et al. 2018).  
23 These are Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,  Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.  
24 The last national election year might not be identical to the current ESS survey year. Consequently, both the 
individual's income decile and the existence of national fiscal rules might, in some cases, have been different in the 
last election year. However, in most cases, both the income decile and the existence of national fiscal rules in the 
current year also reflect , at least partly, the situation in the last election year. Consequently, the interaction between 
these variables should produce, on average, the correct estimate, especially with the use of country-fixed effects.  
25 Results are available upon request.  
19 
 
household’s income decile, based on self-reporting in the ESS survey.26 If fiscal rules would 
increase the inequality in turnout between individuals from high income versus low income 
households, we should expect a positive and statistically significant effect of this interaction 
variable.  
 
I also include a number of individual-level controls including marital status, whether the respondent 
is unemployed as well as the age and the square of age of the respondent. I also include the 
education level of the respondent.27 These types of predictors of individual-level turnout are some 
of the most commonly used in the literature (Smets and van Ham 2013, 348-350) and are also used 
in other studies, which relies on the ESS data to study turnout (Jensen and Jespersen 2017). The 
regression equation can be seen in equation 2, where each respondent is indexed by r, each round of 
the ESS survey by e and each country by i. Y is whether the respondent voted in the last national 
election, Fiscal rule is the existence of at fiscal rule with a statutory and/or constitutional basis in 
the relevant country at the time of the ESS round, and Income is the respondent’s household’s 
income decile. The constituting items of this interaction are also included in the estimation and are 
                                                          
26 Since the ESS survey rounds in the years 2002, 2004 and 2006 recorded relative income on a 1-12 point scale, the 
household income scale is rescaled to run from 1 to 10 for these rounds.  
27 Education level is included as a dummy for each level of education based on the ISCED classification, which runs 
from no education to higher tertiary education.  
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denoted by C.  X is a vector of controls,    is the ESS round-fixed effects,   is the country-fixed 
effects,28 while  is the error term.  
Pr [$%  = 1] =  
  ()% +%  + *%  +  +  + %             (2) 
Since fiscal rules only exhibits variance at the country-level, standard errors are clustered by 
country.  
 
The results for the linear probability models can be found in table 2. Contrary to the expectation that 
fiscal rules increase turnout inequality, the interactions between the income decile variable and the 
different fiscal rules are all clearly statistically insignificant and some even have a negative sign.29 
While relative income status does seem to be increase the propensity to have voted in the last 
election, in all estimations, this effect is not magnified by the existence of fiscal rules with statutory 
and/or constitutional bases. The results are similar if the dummies for the different fiscal rules are 
replaced with the fiscal rules indexes. These results can be found in appendix F. The results from 
the individual-level analysis thus suggest that national fiscal rules do not seem to increase inequality 
in turnout between high and low income individuals.  
 
                                                          
28 Consequently, the fiscal rules dummies still capture within-country changes to fiscal rules. However, the interactions 
between fiscal rules and relative income levels are still not statistically significant if the country-fixed effects are 
removed from the estimation.  
29 As noted by Brambor et al. (2006, 74), a statistically insignificant interaction term might still hide a conditional 
statistically significant effect for some values on the mediating variable. However, plotting the interaction terms from 
table 2 still suggests no mediating effect of income on fiscal rules’ effect on turnout. Results are available upon 
request.  
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Table 2: Fiscal rules and inequality in turnout with ESS data  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income decile  0.0101 (0.0018)*** 
0.0096 
(0.0017)*** 
0.0090 
(0.0018)*** 
0.0097 
(0.0018)*** 
Expenditure rule 0.0209 (0.0162)   - - - 
Expenditure rule X income decile  -0.0028 (0.0027) - - - 
Revenue rule - -0.0307 (0.0215)   - - 
Revenue rule X income decile - -0.0006  (0.0033)    - - 
Balanced budget rule  - - -0.0059 (0.0220) - 
Balanced budget rule X income decile - - 0.0019 (0.0027) - 
Debt rule  - - - 
-0.0293 
(0.0248)   
 
Debt rule X income decile  - - -  -0.0003 (0.0039) 
Married 0.0440 (0.0059)*** 
0.0445 
(.0060)*** 
0.0440 
(0.0059)*** 
0.0440 
(0.0059)*** 
Unemployed -0.0572 (0.0092)*** 
-0.0571 
(0.0092)*** 
-0.0571 
(0.0091)*** 
-0.0571  
(0.0092)***   
Age 0.0274 (0.0011)*** 
0.0274 
(0.0011)*** 
0.0274 
(0.0011)*** 
0.0274 
(0.0011)*** 
Age squared -0.0002 (0.0000)*** 
-0.0002 
(0.0000)*** 
-0.0002 
(0.0000)*** 
-0.0002 
(0.0000)*** 
Education level dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ESS round-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 240,600 240,600 240,600 240,600 
R-squared  0.1926 0.1926 0.1926 0.1926 
Note: Dependent variable is whether the respondent voted in the last national election. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.  
*: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. 
 
Addressing causality: Difference-in-discontinuity evidence from Italian municipalities 
The results from the above analyses seem to suggest that the existence and strength of national 
fiscal rules have little to no robust effect on aggregate level turnout and do not seem to neither 
increase or decrease inequality in electoral turnout. However, while figure 2 suggest that the 
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introduction of fiscal rules are not preceded by any noticeable trends in electoral turnout in the 
studied countries, issues of causal identification might still be raised. In order to address the causal 
identification of the null effect of fiscal rules on electoral turnout, I exploit a discontinuity among 
Italian municipalities previously used to study the pure fiscal policy effects of subnational fiscal 
rules (Grembi et al. 2016). This enables me not only but also to investigate the effect on fiscal rules 
on electoral turnout in an additional empirical setting but also, through the use of a population-
based regression-discontinuity design, to causally identify potential effects on turnout of being 
subject to a fiscal rule.  
 
In 1999, Italian municipalities became subject to the so-called Domestic Stability Pact, which 
through the Italian annual budget law sought to restrain growth in the annual deficits of Italian 
municipalities. This deficit growth target was set to zero percent in in the years 1999, 2000, 2003 
and 2004, 3 percent in 2001 and 2.5 percent in 2002.30 The sanction for non-compliance was severe 
cuts in central government transfers and reimbursements as well as a ban on municipal hiring, so 
this fiscal rules framework was both a substantial restraint on local fiscal policy and provided a 
large incentive to adhere by the rules locally. However, in 2001, the Italian central government 
relaxed these rules so that they did not cover municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants (Grembi et al. 
2016, 6-7). In this way, this reform created a sharp discontinuity between municipalities subject to 
the fiscal rules and municipalities not subject to the fiscal rules, which makes this cut point ideal for 
identifying the causal effect of fiscal rules through a regression-discontinuity design including their 
potential effects on electoral turnout. If fiscal rules causally decrease electoral turnout, we should 
                                                          
30 As noted by Grembi et al. (2016, 5-6) the rules were much more frequently changed after 2004.  So, like in their 
study, this study is restricted to the years 1999-2004.  
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expect turnout in municipal elections to be higher in municipalities just below the 5,000 inhabitant 
threshold compared to municipalities just above the 5,000 inhabitant threshold.  
 
However, since the 5,000 population threshold also increases the local mayor’s wage, which 
previous research has found to substantially increase electoral turnout in Italian municipalities (De 
Benedetto and De Paola 2017), a simple regression discontinuity design is invalidated since the 
threshold policy treatment is confounded by this other policy change (Eggers et al. 2018). In order 
to address this issue, I follow the methodology of Grembi et al. (2016) and exploit that fact that the 
bump in the mayor’s wage at 5,000 inhabitants was in place throughout the entire period while the 
exemption of the fiscal rules only happened from 2001 and onwards. As shown by Grembi et al. 
(2016, 8-12), adequately controlling for both the population threshold and the period where the 
fiscal rules were relaxed can causally identify the effects of relaxing the fiscal rules which can be 
denoted as a difference-in-discontinuity research design. The estimation itself is done by a local 
linear regression, where the effect of simultaneously being below the 5,000 threshold in the year 
2001 and after is estimated for municipalities just below and just above the 5,000 inhabitant 
threshold. I follow Grembi et al. (2016) and estimate the bandwidth lengths using the updated 
software package by Calonico et al. (2017)31 based on Calonico et al. (2014). I also report 
estimations from higher and lower bandwidths as a robustness check. The regression equation itself 
can be seen in equation 3.  
	

 = 	 + 	( + *	( + +( + , + -	 + .( +    (3) 
                                                          
31 Concretely, I use the rdrobust Stata command to estimate the 5,000 threshold effect for the observations before 
2001 and the observations in 2001 and after. I then use the average of the bandwidths for these two estimations.  
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The variable of interest to estimate the effect of relaxing fiscal rules on turnout is the 	 
interaction where  is a dummy for whether the municipality is below the 5,000 inhabitant 
threshold and 	 is a dummy for the 2001 and after period. If being subject to fiscal rules would 
reduce electoral turnout, we should expect the coefficient for this interaction to be positive and 
statistically significant. ( is a variable measuring the distance to the 5,000 inhabitant threshold. 
The data for population size is from a version of the dataset used by Grembi et al. (2016) and is 
originally from the Italian Ministry of Interior,32 which is merged with municipal turnout data is 
from the Italian Home Office.33 The dataset only contains Italian municipalities with between 3,500 
and 7,000 inhabitants and excludes municipalities in regions with special autonomy.34  
 
The results for this difference-in-discontinuity design can be seen in table 3. In column one, the 
estimation is done using a bandwidth length calculated using the Calonico et al. (2017) algorithm. If 
fiscal rules indeed decrease electoral turnout, we should expect the effect of the fiscal rules 
relaxation to be positive and statistically significant. However, contrary to this expectation, the beta 
coefficient in column one is strongly statistically insignificant. It stays insignificant with both 
decreasing and increasing the bandwidth lengths in columns two to four, and even in one instance 
becomes negative. 
  
                                                          
32 Based on either the 1991 and 2001 Italian census (Grembi et al. 2016, 13).  
33 I am extremely grateful to Veronica Grembi for sharing the general municipal data and to Nicola Mastrorocco for 
providing the turnout data. Turnout data is not available for all municipalities in the Grembi et al. (2016) data.  
34 It also excludes a single municipality (Pantigliate) which had a recorded turnout level of over 100 percent in the 
2004 election. Including this municipality does not change the results. These results can be found in appendix G.  
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Table 3: Difference-in-discontinuity estimations 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Effect of relaxing fiscal rules 0.01 (0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
Bandwidth 564 400 800 1000 
Observations 420 307 589 775 
Note: Dependent variable is turnout in municipal elections. Column one reports bandwidths based on the algorithm of  
Calonico et al. (2017). Municipal-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. 
 
In figure 3, the difference-in-discontinuity result is shown visually following the methods of 
Grembi et al. (2016, 16-17). Here, the y-axis represents the within-municipality difference in 
turnout between the years where the fiscal rules were relaxed (in the year 2001 and beyond) and the 
years where these rules were in place for all municipalities (1999 and 2000) and the x-axis the 
distance to the 5,000 inhabitant threshold. Again, there is no evidence for a systematic increase in 
turnout below the 5,000 inhabitant threshold, where the fiscal rules were not in place after 2000. 
These results suggest no effect of fiscal rules on electoral turnout in Italian municipalities. Even 
when the effects of fiscal rules are locally causally identified, fiscal rules do not seem to have any 
effect on electoral turnout. 
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Figure 3: Difference-in-discontinuity estimate 
 
Note: The inner line represents a third-order polynomial fit. Outer lines represent 90 percent confidence intervals.  
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Discussion and conclusion  
A popular theoretical argument in the study of electoral turnout is that constraints on government 
action reduce electoral turnout. Within the area of government fiscal policy, fiscal rules, which are 
spreading fast among countries, could be an important constraint on government fiscal policy. This 
article has investigated empirically whether the enactment of fiscal rules and the stringency of the 
fiscal rules’ framework matter for electoral turnout and turnout inequality in democracies. Contrary 
to recent theoretical arguments (Hortala-Vallve and Larcinese 2017), however, there seems to be 
little statistically robust evidence in favor of fiscal rules having a negative effect on within-country 
electoral turnout levels. Only the existence and strength of fiscal rules related to public expenditures 
has a statistically significant negative association with turnout. An effect which is not robust to 
restricting the panel sample to OECD countries where the effect of fiscal rules on turnout should be 
expected to be largest. An analysis of individual-level data from the European Social Survey also 
suggests that fiscal rules do not increase inequality in turnout propensity between individuals from 
low and high income households. Further evidence from a difference-in-discontinuity design using 
Italian municipal data suggest that these null findings are plausible causally identified. While fiscal 
rules might matter for government fiscal policy they do not seem to matter much for voters’ 
willingness to participate electorally.  
 
The question remains for why we observe these general non-findings? The obvious explanation is 
of course that fiscal rules might not really be a constraint on government fiscal policy, in which case 
it makes sense that they do not lower aggregate turnout levels or affect inequality in electoral 
turnout. It is still an on-going scholarly debate whether fiscal rules actually have a causal effect on 
fiscal policies (Heinemann et al. 2018). Another possibility is that even if fiscal rules really 
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constrain fiscal policy, voters might not be aware of the existence and effectiveness of fiscal rules. 
A crucial assumption in the argument of Hortala-Vallve and Larcinese (2017) is that the voters 
actually know that public policy is constrained by a policy rule which might not be a realistic 
assumption. Another possibility is that voters might know both the existence and potential effects of 
fiscal rules but that they do not factor it in when making the decision to turn out to elections or not. 
Instead, non-instrumental drivers of turnout might be far more important than whether elected 
officials will be constrained in their fiscal policy choices. In this way, the article contributes to the 
classic and continuing discussion in political science about the contributions and limitations of 
instrumental and/rational choice models of the voting action (Aldrich 1993, Green and Shapiro 
1994, 47-71; Enos and Fowler 2014).  
 
However, even accepting that the eventual policy outcome of elections might matter for turnout, the 
results of this article suggest that perhaps not all formal and informal constraints on government 
action are created equal with regards to their effect on turnout. Many types of structural and 
institutional constraints on government policies might affect turnout negatively (Steiner and Martin 
2012; Marshall and Fisher 2015; Steiner 2016; Häusermann et al. 2018) but the results of this article 
show that the story of increased government constraints as inevitably leading to lower citizen 
political engagement might be too simplistic. Future research should keep this in mind and perhaps 
also be more open to pursuing and publishing null results within this research agenda. As the results 
from Italian municipalities show, increased use of causal identification in this research area might 
be a fruitful way to pursue better effect estimates and to supplement previous country-level 
regression studies.  
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The findings also speaks to discussions about inequality in voting and related distributive issues. In 
the wealthy OECD countries, where we should expect turnout inequality to be highest (Kasara and 
Suryanarayan 2015), the effects of fiscal rules on turnout were generally most statistically non-
robust. Furthermore, the results from the European Social Survey data also suggest that fiscal rules 
might not increase the effect of relative income status on the propensity to turn out in elections, at 
least in European countries. These results cast some doubt on whether fiscal rules really matters for 
not only total electoral turnout but also turnout inequality and subsequent the welfare of poorer 
voters. If fiscal rules do not matter for aggregate turnout or inequality in turnout, the results of this 
article speak to the wider scholarly and policy discussion about the distributional consequences of 
fiscal rules. At least the political participation channel suggested by Hortala-Vallve and Larcinese 
(2017) might not be the relevant channel for how fiscal rules affect redistribution and inequality.  
 
The results of this article thus suggest that perhaps the issue of electoral and other types of political 
participation as well as the issue of inequality of political participation are lesser concerns in the 
discussion on the desirability of fiscal rules. The enactment and strengthening of national fiscal 
rules might indeed have distributional consequences, but the results of this article suggest that this 
might not happen through an electoral channel. In a time when fiscal rules are spreading fast among 
countries, policymakers and scholars should have these results in mind when discussing the pros 
and cons of fiscal rules.  
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